As of the end of summer 2026, the full-scale war waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine has no parallel since the Second World War. Since the second half of 2026, the scale of Russia’s air attacks has increasingly taken on the characteristics of a deliberate and systematic effort to destroy Ukraine’s transport, logistics, industrial and social infrastructure. This is aimed not only at changing the course of hostilities, but also at extending the effects of the war across the entire country in order to create a socio-economic, financial and demographic crisis.

All of this has been made possible by the continuation of the war and by technological innovation, above all through the use of unmanned systems and artificial intelligence. I believe this is precisely why armed forces and Western states need to adapt immediately to new forms and methods of warfare if they are to avoid catastrophe. On the one hand, this represents a vast field for investment; on the other, we face an impasse built on bureaucracy and an unwillingness to change. It is comfortable to have verbal security guarantees, a quiet and peaceful life, stable revenues from old contracts, and the same conditional sense of security. A security environment in which everyone hopes someone else will take responsibility. But I have not come here to lecture you. I am speaking about Ukraine, which continues to fight because there is no other way. And about the hope of victory, which remains.

Ukraine is grateful for every package of support provided by our partners. This support is crucial to our ability to defend ourselves and survive, and to the security of the Euro-Atlantic space. A space in which a struggle is taking place between the desire to have cheap energy and the possibility of preserving our own freedom and security.

At the same time, to achieve victory — or, as we now tend to say, to achieve a just peace — what is required is sustained, systemic pressure on Russia’s ability to continue the war. Such systemic pressure has nothing to do with individual technological solutions or with the way events are presented on social media. Systemic impact means implementing strategies designed to achieve the ultimate objective: victory over the enemy.

Clearly, such systemic pressure can only be built on the basis of appropriate strategies. These strategies must be underpinned by financial and technological policies that enable us to produce today what will be needed tomorrow — or, better still, the day after tomorrow. What is needed today should come from existing stocks, as equipment produced yesterday. Defence production must be part of a strategy for war, rather than the other way around, with the war being used to justify someone’s promises and profits. Only in this way can we seize the initiative, impose our will on the adversary and make demands of them.

You have heard two key concepts that are absolutely relevant to everyone present here: finance and technology. These are the foundations of future investment that can be channelled into Ukrainian experience and, as a result, into European victory. Because no one wants to share Ukraine’s fate. And this is something that may already be running out in Britain as a state, but which exists in sufficient quantity in the private sector. The private sector simply does not yet see everything I am talking about today. And I am not talking about marketing that delivers little beyond media visibility and easy, short-term excess profits. I am talking about investment. Investment in the future — financial and technological — as part not only of Ukraine’s strategy for victory, but also as a long-term investment in our own national defence capabilities and our own security.

Ukraine has created an almost entirely new and modern defence industry based on cutting-edge technologies. However, much of this has been an experience of using access to technologies provided by others and seeking to make them cheaper. One consequence, for example, has been the transformation of unmanned systems into the principal means of delivering effects for ground forces. Ukraine has acquired extensive experience in drone production, but the component supply base — and, in particular, its manufacturing capacity — remains largely outside Ukraine. This limits both the ability to scale up production and to modernise it in the longer term. A future in which marketing gives way to strategy and the outlines of victory finally become visible.

These investments are already urgently needed to counter immediate threats such as ballistic missiles and jet-powered drones. In my personal view, incidentally, the jet-powered Shahed has demonstrated the evolution of technology particularly clearly: from an expensive Cold War-era missile to a cheap missile of the age of machine warfare. Yes, I did not misspeak — it is a missile. But it is a missile that is no longer a weapon of the chosen few.

So I have a question: should defence against this weapon also become a privilege of the chosen few because of its enormous cost? How will you defend yourselves against such a weapon when doing so is economically prohibitive or simply impossible? Probably not. And the more we treat technology as a means of warfare reserved for the chosen and the wealthy, and as an opportunity to make money from it today, the sooner we will become victims of the poor and dissatisfied of tomorrow. Because their weapons are already extremely cheap, accessible and capable of delivering maximum lethal force.

Ukrainian companies are capable of responding rapidly to battlefield needs and developing new types of weapons based on real combat experience. No other country can offer more relevant experience for the development of new weapons, their modernisation and the ways in which they are employed. Yet the lack of technology and financing prevents us from seizing the initiative from Russia and its partners.

Therefore, we call on our partners to increase financial and technological investment in weapons production in Ukraine — not only to reduce Russia’s military potential, but also to strengthen their own defence capabilities.

State funding for defence innovation in Ukraine is limited. Private investment can therefore become — and should become — a mutually beneficial solution. Establishing clear mechanisms for cooperation with the United Kingdom at the institutional level would help attract private capital and technology, ultimately creating new markets and developing long-term cooperation between the defence industries of Ukraine and its partners.